• Greg Fealy

04 October 2005Terrorism in Indonesia has evolved since the last bombing, writes Greg Fealy




IT IS too early to speak with any certainty about who carried out Saturday’s bombings in Bali. Undoubtedly, though, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) will be singled out as the most likely perpetrator.



This is understandable, given JI’s record of mass-casualty terrorism since 2000, but recent developments within JI and, more broadly, Indonesian jihadist groups suggest that JI should not be the only suspect.



The International Crisis Group has adduced evidence of growing rifts within JI, particularly between the ‘bombers’, who favour continued large-scale attacks, and the ‘non-bombers’, who believe that JI should revert to a longer-term strategy of preaching, education and military training in order to achieve its primary goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia.



The bombers believe that terrorism against Islam’s foes is the only way to protect Muslims and is thus a religious obligation. The non-bombers argue that terrorist attacks like those in Bali in October 2002, or at the Marriott Hotel and Australian embassy in Jakarta in August 2003 and September 2004 respectively, are not only unjustified according to Islamic law but have also harmed JI’s struggle by provoking a massive crackdown by Indonesian and international security agencies.



Some sources suggest that the non-bombers may be ascendant and as a result the bombers are marginalised.



What is reasonably certain is that two of JI’s most notorious operatives, the Malaysians Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammad Top, are recruiting and organising outside JI structures. In putting together the Australian embassy bombing last year they seemed to be working without the approval of the central JI leadership and recruited foot soldiers for that operation from other jihadist networks.



Jihadists who have fought in the Muslim-Christian conflict in eastern Indonesia (particularly the provinces of Maluku and Central Sulawesi) are emerging as an increasingly important source of recruits for terrorist operations. Azhari, Noordin and other terrorist leaders are using networks created through this sectarian violence to find new operatives who are ‘blooded’ in violent jihad. These recruits are drawn from groups such as Darul Islam, Mujahidin Kompak and Wahdah Islamiyah.



Hence, terrorism networks in Indonesia are becoming more diffuse and the JI-centric approach of several years ago is no longer adequate in monitoring and preventing jihadist attacks.



JI retains the capacity to mount highly lethal attacks but may no longer be the central node of Indonesian terrorist networks. Increasingly, non-JI groups and individuals are keen to join terrorist operations and growing numbers of them are acquiring terrorist capabilities.



Aside from the question of who mounted the weekend’s Bali bombing, there is also the question of why they did so. If the statements of the 2002 Bali bombers and the Australian embassy attackers are any guide, the primary aim was to kill Westerners, specifically citizens of the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Britain, because these countries are seen as posing a mortal threat to Islam.



To quote from the diary of the Bali bomber Aly Ghufron (alias Muchlas): ‘Bali is the area most often visited by foreign tourists, particularly from Western and other countries, which nota bene are the countries that ally themselves with America and participate directly in the coalition army led by it... These countries include England, Australia, France, Germany.’



He further wrote that the Sari Club was attacked because ‘we obtained solid data that this entertainment venue was only for foreigners’. He makes it clear that it was not targeted because it was a place of immoral behaviour.



Another Bali bomber, Imam Samudra, declared: ‘The Bali bombing was part of the resistance aimed at the coloniser, America, and its allies’, which ‘have, are and will continue to massacre the civilians of Muslim nations. War will be met with war, blood with blood, lives with lives’.



This is ample evidence that our close relations with the US and involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have made us a legitimate target in the eyes of the terrorists, despite Australian government assertions to the contrary.



The choice of Bali for a repeat attack is probably linked to the perceived failure of the Marriott Hotel and Australian embassy bombings, as in both these operations most of the victims were ordinary Indonesian Muslims, not foreigners of other faiths. Within jihadist circles, these bombings were seen as counterproductive, in that they caused JI sympathisers to question the effectiveness of such attacks.



If, as appears likely, most of those killed in Saturday’s attacks were non-Muslim, then the bombers can claim to be smiting once again Islam’s enemies.



This second Bali bombing shows the competence (or perhaps luck) of the perpetrators in conducting a covert operation in what would usually be regarded as an uncongenial environment. Of all Indonesia’s provinces, Hindu-dominated Bali has been the hardest hit by past terrorist acts. Yet because of this it has probably become the province that is hardest to hit. Community vigilance and preparedness to inform police of suspicious activities would be higher there than in any other part of the country.



Regardless of whether it was mounted by JI or another group, the latest bombing shows that terrorism in Indonesia will continue to be a deadly threat for many years to come. •



Greg Fealy is lecturer and research fellow in Indonesian politics at the Australian National University.


Photo: Kok Chuan Wong/ iStockphoto.com